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ABSTRACT  
The year 2016 will be long associated to the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States. Although the film studies literature on 
―Trump‘s America‖ is yet to be written, there are instances of American 
films addressing the conditions leading to the seismic shifts of 2016. This 
article examines the film Hell or High Water in light of the epochal 
political changes of the year 2016. Drawing on the concept of populism 
and analyzing the central aspects of neoliberalism, I argue that Hell or 
High Water represents the state of the political camps circa 2016, as well 
as the political and economic demands prefiguring a potential populist 
reaction.  
RESUMEN 
El año 2016 estará largamente asociado a la elección de Donald Trump 
como presidente de los Estados Unidos. Aunque la literatura desde el 
campo de los estudios de cine sobre la ―América de Trump‖  está por 
escribirse, podemos encontrar ejemplos de películas americanas 
                                                          
1 This article is part of the Research Project ―Justice, Citizenship and Vulnerability: 
Precarious Narratives and Intersectional Approaches‖ (FFI2015-63895-C2-1-R), 
funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. I have previously 
addressed some of the themes of this article in the paper ―‗We the People‘ Right-wing 
Populism in Law Abiding Citizen and Hell or High Water‖ delivered in the 2017 
AEDEAN Conference held at the University of La Laguna. In addition, I would like to 
thank the Franklin Institute at the University of Alcalá de Henares, where I completed 
the last writing and research stages for this article.    
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centradas en describir las condiciones que han llevado a los profundos 
cambios de 2016. Este artículo analiza la película Comanchería a la luz 
de los dramáticos cambios políticos del año 2016. Usando el concepto de 
populismo y analizando los aspectos vertebradores del neoliberalismo, 
sostengo que Comanchería representa el estado de los campos políticos 
en el año 2016, así como las demandas políticas y económicas que 
prefiguran una potencial reacción populista.  
 
Trump is the symptom. He is not the disease. 
Chris Hedges (min.8) 
 
So, ultimately, whoever complains about populism should also 
complain about neoliberalism. One thing leads to the other.2  
Jose Luis Villacañas (116) 
  
In a recent interview former Chief Strategist for Donald Trump Steve 
Bannon repeatedly used the phrase ―the Party of Davos,‖ making 
reference to the ―the scientific, managerial, engineering, financial 
elites in the city of London [or in] Wall Street; these corporatists that 
don‘t care about the little guy, they look at the little guy as just 
another unit of production, right? A unit of consumption‖ (―Europe‖ 
min.14). During the 2016 primary season, Senator Bernie Sanders 
spoke about the financial sector along these lines: ―In 2008, the 
greed, recklessness and illegal behavior on Wall Street nearly 
destroyed the American and global economy. Millions of Americans 
lost their jobs […] their homes and […] their life savings‖ (Sanders 
―Remarks‖). How so that, despite irreconcilable differences between 
both individuals, the two statements are virtually interchangeable in 
their projection of a destructive elite vs. a battered majority?  
The conceptual linkage between both messages is populism—
the will to address, unify, and defend ―a people‖ as opposed to a 
privileged, predatory minority. As theorist of populism Ernesto 
Laclau spelt out ―by ‗populism‘ we do not understand a type of 
movement—identifiable with either a base or a particular ideological 
orientation—but a political logic‖ (117). A corollary question ensues: 
what conditions have operated so that the former head of the far-
right Breitbart News and a self-avowed democratic socialist have 
formulated identical diagnoses of American politics? Critical theorist 
Nancy Fraser has claimed that, notwithstanding differences in 
                                                          
2 My translation. Original quotation: ―Así, en último extremo, quien se queje de 
populismo, debería quejarse también del neoliberalismo. Una cosa lleva a la otra.‖  
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ideology and goals, the movements spearheaded by Sanders and 
Trump share a common target: ―[they] are rejections of corporate 
globalization, neoliberalism, and the political establishments that 
have promoted them‖ (―The End‖). 
Scholars of American Studies will surely brood over these 
issues in seeking to map out and unpack the strands leading to the 
year 2016. It will not be long before American filmmakers produce a 
body of work addressing the earthquake brought about by the 
election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States. 
A mere year and a half into his stewardship, American film has not 
had time to grapple with ―Trump‘s America‖ in an explicitly textual 
manner.3 The literature on American film and Trump‘s America is yet 
to be written.  
However, my proposition is that some American films have 
been released as of late showcasing, not so much the narrow tropes 
and discourses of ―Trumpism‖ or ―Trump‘s America‖ but, rather, the 
fault-lines of American politics paving the way for a moment of 
historical acceleration as 2016 certainly was.4 The most politically 
eloquent and thematically acute example of this is the 2016 post-
western5 bank-heist thriller film Hell or High Water directed by David 
MacKenzie and penned by Taylor Sheridan. I argue this is the one 
American film illuminating what 2016 ultimately signified: a populist 
moment of repudiation of the elites amidst the fraying of American 
neoliberalism. Mackenzie‘s film is less a forecast of the 2016 
presidential election than a low-key portrait of a set of unaddressed 
claims and untapped resentments—the basic precondition for a 
populist upset to take place regardless of its ideological color. In 
relation to this, I will try to prove how the film presents an array of 
unfulfilled frustrations and miseries as wrought by neoliberalism, yet 
the film as a whole can hardly be pinned to one clear-cut ideological 
undercurrent. In other words, Hell or High Water represents the 
populist moment of 2016 and its various constituents but the 
                                                          
3 Some 2017 releases such as Get Out, The Post, or The Shape of Water may arguably 
be read as containing some allegorical elements vis-à-vis the political state of affairs 
circa 2016. See Freedland, Patterson, and Richardson.   
4 See Deepwater Horizon—where hints of blue collar and working class anxiety 
surface—and 99 Homes–centered on the foreclosure crisis. 
5 I am here borrowing Neil Campbell‘s notion of the post-western (2013)—western films 
which reassess classical narratives of the genre by voicing and foregrounding themes 
and motifs that, albeit traceable in classical westerns, do not comply with the 
hegemonic politics, cultural discourse, and iconography of the genre.    
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narration does not prescribe the overall ideological channeling that 
populist moment may be tied up to. Thus, the film displays the ―raw 
materials‖ that were at hand for a populist surge to occur around the 




1. A FRAMEWORK FOR 2016: POPULISM AND NEOLIBERALISM  
 
Both a radicalization and a theoretical fine-tuning of Gramscian 
hegemony, the concept of populism tries to undo some of the 
essentialisms sustaining the more orthodox forms of Marxism 
(Critchley and Marchart 3). Drawing substantially on post-
structuralism, authors like Laclau and political philosopher Chantal 
Mouffe reject ―the conviction that the social is sutured at some point, 
from which it is possible to fix the meaning of any event 
independently of any articulatory practice‖ (177). Theorists of 
populism radicalize Gramscian hegemony insofar as they underscore 
the nature of political universalities as articulated. Consent is 
necessarily a constructed, assembled thing which, in turn, is 
legitimized and naturalized. With a finite set of raw materials 
produced by the contingencies of political and historical struggles, a 
hegemonic identity persuades a range of political bodies to coalesce 
into one bloc. Hence, the production of hegemony entails thinking of 
political signification not as entirely malleable but as unstable and, 
indeed, as subject to negotiation and contestation:   
 
The general field of the emergence of hegemony is that of articulatory 
practices, that is, a field where the ‗elements‘ have not crystallized 
into ‗moments‘. In a closed system of relational identities, in which 
the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed, there is no place 
whatsoever for a hegemonic practice. […] It is because hegemony 
supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that it 
can take place only in a field dominated by articulatory practices. 
(Laclau and Mouffe 134)  
 
Herein lies the main proposition of populism: the possibility of 
fashioning a partial universality—i.e. a hegemony—called ―the 
people.‖    
―[P]opulism,‖ elaborates Laclau, ―requires the dichotomic 
division of society into two camps—one presenting itself as a part 
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which claims to be the whole; [...] this dichotomy involves the 
antagonistic division of the social field; and [...] the popular camp 
presupposes, as condition of its constitution, the construction of a 
global identity out of the equivalence of a plurality of social demands‖ 
(83). Provided that the institutional framework be somewhat broken 
(Laclau 177; Villacañas 59), populism is essentially the rhetorical 
construction of the people by means of merging a variety of 
unfulfilled, untapped demands the system has dismissed or 
discarded. The logic of populism dichotomizes society, revealing the 
people as being against an antagonistic entity fundamentally 
opposed to the former‘s interests and wellbeing. What or who that 
antagonistic entity is—racial minorities or oligarchies; welfare 
recipients or bankers—will depend on the ideological compass a 
given populism pivots on.   
Therefore, my analysis will seek to identify the populist logics 
in Hell or High Water, that is, instances of political dichotomization 
prior to specific ideological articulations—although the film may 
occasionally show the latter. Thus, I am less interested in which 
characters, institutions, and discourses are cast as being 
constitutive of the people than which are portrayed as destructive 
and harmful to the people. That way we can characterize the political 
camp leading to 2016 at large—across partisan and ideology lines—
and the way it lent itself to the dichotomizations typical of populism. 
By doing so, I will likewise point out the demands the system has 
failed to address—these demands being largely byproducts of 
neoliberal hegemony. In conclusion, I will show the way the film 
points out the staples of the populist moment of 2016. 
Characterizing those staples poses quite a difficulty though. 
The historical-political matrix of the film is constituted by a 
handful of structural transformations harking back to, at least, the 
Reagan era—namely globalization, outsourcing, deindustrialization, 
an increasingly financialized capitalism, ill-adjustment to cultural 
and demographic changes in the nation, and record-breaking levels 
of income inequality.6 Historian Wyatt Wells encapsulates the 
dynamics undergirding these processes: ―From the 1930s through 
the 1960s economic policy had sought to smooth out the rough 
edges of capitalism by limiting destructive competition, protecting 
workers, and stabilizing demand. Starting in the late 1970s, 
                                                          
6 For studies of these phenomena see Aronowitz; Formisano, Plutocracy; Harvey 
Neoliberalism; Kemp; Peck; Wartzman; Wells.      
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government policy increasingly sought to hone the cutting edge of the 
capitalist system, encouraging innovation, investment, and risk-
taking‖ (195). The political and economic background of Hell or High 
Water embodies the most uncomfortable byproducts of the transition 
described by Wells—that which moved the US from postwar 
Keynesian-Fordist capitalism to neoliberalism (Harvey, Postmodernity 
124; Jessop 262; Wacquant 267).  
In their appraisal of neoliberalism and its global projection, 
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell comment on how ―[l]ocalities […] have 
[...] become ‗hostile brothers‘, flinging themselves into the competitive 
process of attracting jobs and investment by bargaining away living 
standards and regulatory controls. Needless to say, not all localities 
can be victorious in this competition, the losers ending up with more 
than their share of global unemployment‖ (280-281). Driven by the 
goal of global competitiveness (Dardot and Laval 153), these shifts in 
the political and economic makeup of American society have 
particularly impacted a historically privileged demographic:     
 
[W]ell-paid, union-protected jobs through which a man could 
support a stay-at-home wife are gone for all but a small elite. Given 
automation and corporate offshoring real wages of high school-
educated American men have fallen 40 percent since 1970. For the 
whole bottom 90 percent of workers, average wages have flattened 
since 1980. Many older white men are in despair. Indeed, such men 
suffer a higher than average death rate due to alcohol, drugs, and 
even suicide. Although life expectancy for nearly every other group is 
rising, between 1990 and 2008 the life expectancy of older white 
men without high school diplomas has been shortened by three 
years. (Hochschild 125-126) 
 
White working class men with no college degree—the demographic 
dominating Hell or High Water—have ranked among the most 
negatively affected by neoliberalism‘s emphasis on global 
competitiveness. ―American workers displaced by imports,‖ writes 
Wells, ―were often among the least educated and worst paid. They 
might lack the skills to fill better-paying jobs, even if such were 
available‖ (Wells 185). A paradigmatic example, if ever there was one, 
of the transition from Keynesian-Fordist capitalism to neoliberalism 
lies in the contrast between the two largest employers in both 
periods: General Motors and Wal-Mart. In his history of corporate 
America, Rick Wartzman explores such contrast as well as the 
material realities implicit in it:   
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In terms of scale, Wal-Mart was the obvious successor to GM. In 
2002, the retailer became the biggest corporation in America, 
topping the Fortune 500 list for the first time. By 2005, its revenues 
exceeded $285 billion, and profits surpassed $10 billion. […] But 
there was a massive difference between GM and Wal-Mart. While the 
former had put most of its workers on a secure route to the middle 
class, the latter was placing many on a path to impoverishment. […]  
In 2005, most Wal-Mart workers took home less than ten dollars an 
hour, compared with more than thirty dollars for a nonskilled 
assembly line workers at General Motors. This added up to a yearly 
income at Wal-Mart of about $18,000—below the poverty line for a 
family of four. […] The health benefits that Wal-Mart offered were 
also lacking. As a result, many of its employees had to turn to public 
relief: food stamps, Medicaid, and subsidized housing. (330-332)7 
 
These socio-economic and political conditions represent both the 
breeding ground for the populist groundswell of 2016 and the 
backdrop against which the story of Hell or High Water is laid out.  
 
2. “NO BAILOUT FOR PEOPLE LIKE US”: HATRED FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT AS POPULIST UNIFIER   
 
Set up in a modern-day West Texas economically savaged, Hell or 
High Water follows unemployed oil worker Toby Howard (Chris Pine) 
and his ex-con brother Tanner (Ben Foster), who team up to rob 
branches of the Texas Midlands Bank, sticking to a carefully devised 
plan to avoid eviction. Toby intends to raise just enough money to 
pay off the mortgage and leave the family ranch to his sons, where oil 
has been recently found. The Texas Midlands Bank has used every 
trick to foreclose on the mortgage and claim the property. So the 
irony lies on the fact that the brothers will pay the Texas Midlands 
Bank with money stolen from that very bank. The Howard brothers 
are chased by Texas Ranger—and soon-to-be retiree—Marcus 
Hamilton (Jeff Bridges) and his partner Alberto Parker (Gil 
Birmingham). 
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The film opens with a powerful sequence centered on the first 
robbery. A meticulously crafted crane-shot long take in full silence 
introduces us to the microcosm of the film, deploying a potent visual 
grammar that is both narratively fluid and politically illuminating. 
The camera movement visually links a graffiti reading ―three tours in 
Iraq but no bailout for people like us‖ and the façade of a Texas 
Midlands Bank branch (Fig.1). Similar images inhabit the whole 
narration, reminding the audience that, despite macroeconomic 
stabilization, for most 
Americans the Great Recession 
never really ended (Blinder 
14)—long shots of open land 
featuring ads of debt relief and 
fast-cash services and 
foreclosed homes (Fig.2). The 
long shots showing vast 
extensions of land typical of the 
western film, and their ethos of exuberance and opportunity, are 
here transformed, as in most post-westerns, into a  
 
spectral landscape […] a complex 
space much changed from the 
preferred simplicity of a nineteenth-
century version constantly revisited 
by Hollywood with its fundamentally 
clear lines of demarcation around 
issues of race, gender, land use, and 
national identity. (Campbell 15)  
 
The opening long take is worth dwelling on though. Through the 
visual linkage between the graffiti and the Texas Midlands Bank, the 
film makes an explicit connection between a hurting populace and a 
well-secluded and powerful institution; the misery of the former 
leading to the welfare of the latter. In its simplicity and bluntness the 
graffiti message dismantles party and ideology lines—Democrats vs. 
Republicans; progressivism vs. conservatism. That is not the 
linchpin of the message. It is, rather, a denunciation on the basis of 
Figure 2 
Figure 1 
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a ―people vs. elites‖ logic. The banking sector, as well as the actors 
propping it up, are placed ―outside‖ the margins of what constitutes 
the people. 
This critique shortens or, at least, relativizes the distance 
between Democrats and Republicans in terms of economic policy 
solutions in tackling the Great Recession:   
 
Banks were bailed out, no reliefs extended to under-water 
mortgages, criminal executives left unpunished, and the workforce 
participation ratio sank still further, while the top 1 per cent of the 
population became proportionately even richer. Since there was no 
change at the Fed, and this course was already set in the last phase 
of the Bush Administration, not a great deal in this crisis-
management was distinctive under Obama. (Anderson 44) 
 
The populist message of the film seems to comply with such 
diagnosis. Implicitly, the opening sequence codifies a damning 
critique of the Obama Administration and its arguable failure in 
substantially redressing the wrongdoing of Wall Street elites. The 
perception that, during the Obama era, the structural dynamics 
leading to the Great Recession were not corrected and that no 
Rooseveltian, New Deal-style political project was articulated (Frank 
144-145; Rauchway 30-31) underpins the early political disclosures 
of the film. 
This type of anti-establishment discourse seen in Hell or High 
Water can be mobilized by different actors. Occupy Wall Street‘s 
slogan ―We are the 99%‖ comes to mind; so does Bernie Sanders‘ 
systematic focus on Wall Street malpractice as source for much of 
the country‘s problems. However, similar anti-establishment animus 
has been embraced by considerably different political forces, such as 
the Tea Party, a movement that, in many aspects, has nudged the 
ideological axis of the Republican Party further to the right (Logfren 
225). Oftentimes ardently opposed to establishment Republicans 
(Hochschild 47), ―[t]he Tea Party grassroots,‖ writes Richard 
Formisano, ―shares some of the classical hallmarks of the third-
party/independent tradition: suspicion of professional politicians 
[and] frustration with the two-party system and politics as usual. […] 
The Tea Parties‘ grassroots resemble past progressive populism in 
being pervaded by anti-elite sentiment‖ (Tea 17-20). There is a 
similar logic of repudiation of elites binding together all these 
actors—not ideology, let alone a policy agenda.   
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 In a more structural sense, the robbing of banks also 
underpins the film narratively and plot-wise. Occasional 
commentaries are made as to whether the Howards‘ actions are 
legitimate. After the second robbery takes place, Ranger Marcus 
questions some of the witnesses:    
 
Marcus: ―Boys. Y‘all been here for a while?‖ 
Bystander: ―Well, long enough to watch a bank getting robbed that‘s 
been robbing me for 30 years.‖  (min. 29) 
 
Later on, the brothers consult a lawyer in order to launder the stolen 
cash. Visibly sympathetic to their cause, the lawyer advises the 
Howards as follows:  
 
You know, they [The Texas Midlands Bank] loaned the least they 
could. Just enough to keep your mama poor on a guaranteed return. 
Thought they could swipe her land for $25,000. That‘s just so 
arrogant, it makes my teeth hurt. To see you boys pay those 
bastards back with their own money? Well, if that ain‘t Texan, I 
don‘t know what is. (mins. 47-48) 
 
Even once Toby has succeeded in paying off the mortgage and 
retaining the ranch, we witness a western standoff-like scene where 
he refuses to shake hands with the Texas Midlands Bank director, 
with Toby looking ostensibly disgruntled by the director‘s affected 
friendliness to him after the bank had used financial engineering 
trying to foreclose on his property (Fig. 3). 
 







2016: A Populist Odyssey  257 





The film unambiguously indicates there is no social frowning 
upon as regards the banks being robbed. Quite on the contrary, a 
well-entrenched narrative operates showing banks as an elite class 
whose existence is predicated upon extracting resources from regular 
citizens. These portraits of folk anger cannot be fitted in classical 
ideological slots such as left-right or progressive-conservative. These 
axes do very little to explain the internal logic of these last three 
sequences, nor do they shed light on the real political significance of 
the long take at the beginning of the film. In this sense, the film is 
governed by a populist critique, one not primarily guided by ideology 
but by disdain and distrust towards the unaccountable power of an 
elite.8 Precisely, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders tapped into that 
anxiety and its resulting sense of lack of agency and defenselessness. 
In the film, the placeholder for these anti-establishment 
sentiments is the Texas Midlands Banks—an entity presented as 
living off regular citizens. This is connected to the eminently and 
similarly anti-establishment discourses deployed by both outsiders 
during the 2016 presidential campaign. Investigative journalist 
Jeremy Scahill aptly described this question in the aftermath of the 
election:       
  
I do think that Bernie Sanders tapped into the same kind of emotion 
that Trump did in a kind of parallel universe […]  
You have people that voted twice for Barack Obama and then voted 
for Donald Trump, […] what is the common factor there? The 
common factor was this perception that you were voting for an 
outsider. You‘re rejecting establishment politics in the United States. 
And I think a lot of the people who voted for Donald Trump that also 
voted for Barack Obama were people that were looking for a circuit-
breaker, someone that was going to stop business as usual. So it 
didn‘t necessarily matter the ideas Trump was promoting as much 
as he wasn‘t a Hillary Clinton or a Jeb Bush. (mins. 1-2) 
 
The economically battered and politically disempowered citizens of 
Hell or High Water voice a malaise that—whatever its potential 
                                                          
8 This type of political struggles over the meaning of the people is as old as the political 
fabric of the US. See Michael Kazin‘s seminal The Populist Reason: An American 
History.  
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ideological channeling might be—is essentially populist in its 
rejection of the establishment, just as backing Sanders or Trump—
for whom ―the people‖ encompass completely different political 
subjects—meant standing up against political and economic elites.9   
 
3. THE FADING MEMORY OF KEYNES AND FORD: 
NEOLIBERALISM AS PASSAGE TO POPULISM  
  
Hell or High Water emanates an undeniable tone of hopelessness and 
pessimism. Personal indebtedness, poverty, and lack of job 
opportunities loom large both visually and thematically. The 
robberies represent an against-the-clock attempt to prevent the bank 
from stripping the Howards of their sole resource—the ranch—to get 
out of poverty. The gloomy nature of the story does not just pervade 
the aesthetics and the plot, but also the inner world of the 
characters. Ranger Marcus, on the trail of the Howards, is a widowed 
and childless man fearing the utter loneliness of his upcoming years 
as a retiree; his longtime partner Alberto is shot down by Tanner 
towards the end of the film, only to heighten the already tragic 
texture of the narration. Toby and Tanner reveal a family background 
marked by poverty and an abusive father—whom Tanner killed. Toby 
remains unemployed and seeking to reconnect with a family he 
barely gets to see; Tanner is portrayed as an unbalanced and tragic 
man, prone to both violence and loyalty to his brother.  
 That tonal despair and forlornness stem from a set of 
material shortages wrought by neoliberalism, leading to the corrosion 
of fundamental American values such as optimism, classlessness or 
the very notion of the pursuit of happiness—all of which can be 
generically placed under the cultural and political umbrella of the 
American Dream. The proverbial American Dream is, as sociologist 
Arlie Russell Hochschild has written, 
 
a dream of progress—the idea that you‘re better off than your 
forebears just as they superseded their parents before you—and 
extends beyond money and stuff. You‘ve suffered long hours, layoffs, 
and exposure to dangerous chemicals at work, and received reduced 
pensions. You have shown moral character through trial by fire, and 
                                                          
9 Not only did Sanders and Trump revolt against the establishment at large. They 
actively decried the elites of their own parties–especially during the primary debates. 
Also, see Bannon, ―Hannity‖ min.2; Sanders, ―Hardtalk‖ min. 17; Sanders, ―Podcast‖ 
mins. 7-10; Taibbi 7.      
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the American Dream of prosperity and security is a reward for all of 
this, showing who you have been and are—a badge of honor. (136)   
   
This narrative, adds Hochschild, requires a disposition to feeling 
―hopeful, energetic, focused, mobilized. Progress—its core idea—
didn‘t go with feeling confused or mournful‖ (140-141). Neither the 
characters nor the social environment in Hell or High Water adhere to 
the myth of progress and optimism as prescribed in the American 
Dream. In fact, the film‘s zeroing in on economic stagnation and 
joblessness, as well as its refusal to view the future as a by-default 
promise for better living standards, indicates the impossibility to 
fulfill the American Dream through the socially-sanctioned practices 
of hard work, effort, and decency.   
As highlighted earlier, the material landscape of the film is 
inhabited by foreclosure signs, debt relief ads, credit extension 
billboards and the like. The spaces of the west become colonized by 
economics—its products and language integrating in the physicality 
of the place. Theorist Wendy Brown has seen this type of 
economicization of life as a key trait of neoliberalism:   
 
Neoliberalism […] is best understood not simply as economic policy, 
but as a governing rationality that disseminates market values and 
metrics to every sphere of life and construes the human itself as 
homo oeconomicus. Neoliberalism thus does not merely privatize […] 
what was formerly publicly supported and valued. Rather, it 
formulates everything, everywhere, in terms of capital investment 
and appreciation. (176) 
 
Critics of neoliberalism argue that one of its consequences is the 
stripping away of citizens‘ basic economic rights, ultimately favoring 
―strong limits on democratic governance, relying instead upon 
undemocratic and unaccountable institutions (such as the Federal 
Reserve or the IMF) to make key decisions‖ (Harvey, Neoliberalism 
69). The characters in Hell or High Water experience this type of 
political phenomenon—a lack of agency that makes their livelihoods 
be tied to a land whose resources have been siphoned off by an 
extractive elite, in this case, the banking sector.  
As part of this political critique fashioned in the film, the 
viewer is informed that life in West Texas has not always been so 
utterly grey and precarious. Two of the most poignant examples of it 
come fairly early on. As Toby makes small talk with a waitress, he 
bitterly comments that ―there ain‘t nothing high-dollar about drilling. 
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No one seems to be drilling for gas now, anyway‖ (min. 20). Some 
sequences later, one cowboy-looking witness to the second bank 
robbery melancholically says: ―[it] seems foolish […] the days of 
robbing banks and trying to live to spend the money, they‘re long 
gone. Long gone for sure‖ (min. 31). At least two corollaries can be 
extracted. On the one hand, an intelligible and productive economic 
world, where goods and services can be easily bought and sold, does 
not exist anymore—where to spend the stolen money, muses the 
bystander, in such a barren, indebted land? On the other, the 
industrial fabric—along with its well-paying jobs—has been either 
dismantled or reduced to a bare minimum. Both messages indicate a 
yearning that can be related to some of the characteristics of 
Keynesian-Fordist capitalism. The white blue-collar men with no 
college degree10 who voice these concerns seem to long for much of 
the political economy of the postwar boom: overall economic 
predictability and stability, distinct and delineable markets, high 
levels of consumption, and strong manufacturing industries and the 
living wages that came with them (Jessop 253). The world the 
Howard brothers live in is no longer shaped by those structures nor 
is it governed by the so-called ―industrial paternalism‖ or ―welfare 
capitalism‖ under which a sizable—and mostly white—middle-class 
was built (Wartzman 24). They have become ―disposable workers,‖ a 
prototypical figure in the inherently changing and flexible labor world 
of neoliberalism (Harvey, Neoliberalism 169; Jessop 259). Since the 
1980s and 1990s—and fueled by structural dynamics of 
neoliberalism like automation, offshoring, and globalization—the 
white non-college-educated working class has endured a stripping 
away of living standards and economic wellbeing:    
 
When GM and other manufacturers employed a quarter or more of 
the American workforce through the early 1980s, even those without 
much education could land a factory job and do quite well. But what 
were the two-thirds of Americans without a four-year college degree 
supposed to do now? Manufacturing, with its high wages and good 
benefits, employed just 10 percent of Americans by 2010. And even 
many of these industrial jobs and other blue-collar positions now 
                                                          
10 It is fair to say that, for instance, Donald Trump‘s electoral victory was basically ―a 
revolt by white America based on economic resentment‖ along with racial prejudices 
and cultural resistance, as Ralph Nader described it on the very day after the election 
(mins. 23-24) 
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demanded technical instruction beyond high school—something that 
far too few people had. (Wartzman 343) 
  
In relation to this, the bystanders of the robberies and the Howard 
brothers seem to have no formal occupation. We see, though, plenty 
of service sector jobs—waitresses, bartenders, secretaries, clerks—as 
well as the occasional professional—the sympathetic lawyer and the 
Texas Midlands bank executive. This also reflects the labor 
disparities nurtured under neoliberalism, configuring a job market 
where high employment is typical for ―high-education professional, 
technical, and managerial occupations, as well as in low-end service 
work: food preparers, health-care aides, security guards, and so on‖ 
whereas ―both blue-collar and white-collar jobs in between—the work 
of factory hands, sales assistants, clerks, and low-ranking 
administrators who could build a middle-class life, even with little 
formal education—‖ tend to disappear (Wartzman 321-322).  
This set of systemic dynamics represented in the film is 
imbricated, yet again, into a populist logic separating the people vs. 
the elite—one that was of paramount importance in 2016. Unlike the 
more concretized image of the bank as the enemy entity, here the 
populist logic divides the social camp between ―change‖ and 
―continuity.‖ To put it differently, the film palpably shows a 
malfunctioning political and economic system. On that reality, two 
factions were configured in the run-up to the 2016 election.  
A populist bloc claimed that under the current institutional 
conditions the prospect of decent living standards in the future is 
untenable. This thesis is quite visible in the film—e.g. poverty, 
joblessness, a consistent tone of pessimism, a pervasive sense that 
the American dream has gone awry. Such perspective was embraced 
by Sanders and Trump, whose structuring claims were essentially 
formulated from outside and against the political establishment. A 
cursory look at Sanders‘ and Trump‘s political views through their 
rhetoric may reveal their populism in this change vs. continuity axis. 
This is Sanders‘ take on the sociological profile of the Trump voter:  
 
What the media doesn‘t understand, what the establishment doesn‘t 
understand, is there are tens of millions of people who are not 
racists, who are not sexists, they‘re hurting […] If you are 50 percent 
of older American workers, you know how much money you have in 
the bank for retirement? […] Zero […] you‘re scared to death. And 
you‘re getting sick, you go to the doctor, you‘ve got an illness, how 
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do you pay for that? If you are middle-aged right now, you‘ve got a 
couple of kids and you have health insurance, but you have very 
high deductibles and co-payments and you can‘t afford 
prescription drugs, you are scared to death. That is a reality that the 
establishment […] [has] ignored. But that is what millions of people 
are experiencing every day. They are hurting. (mins. 6-8 ―Charlie 
Rose‖) 
When announcing his campaign, then-candidate Trump offered a 
portrait, rich in nativism and economic Keynesianism,11 of a nation 
gripped by an almost irreversible crisis: 
 
But they [China, Japan, and Mexico] are killing us economically. The 
U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else‘s problems. 
[…]  
They‘re [politicians] controlled fully—they‘re controlled fully by the 
lobbyists, by the donors, and by the special interests, fully. Yes, they 
control them. […]  
We need a leader that can bring back our jobs, can bring back our 
manufacturing, can bring back our military.   
 
He then concluded his speech as follows: ―Sadly, the American 
dream is dead. But if I get elected president I will bring it back bigger 
and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America 
great again‖ (Trump). Despite markedly different agendas and 
ideological colorings, the uprisings marshalled by Sanders and 
Trump similarly adhere to one assumption: the economic and 
political structures of the country have ceased to function effectively 
for a majority of Americans (i.e. for ―the people‖).  
Within this populist framework of much needed change vs. 
stagnant continuity, the latter came to be unsurprisingly associated 
to Hillary Clinton‘s campaign. The Democratic candidacy, tellingly 
enough, pivoted on continuing the Obama legacy (Tau), promoting 
messages such as ―America is already great‖ (Clinton; Frank, ―RAI‖ 
mins. 17-18; Sainato), and hailing Clinton as the most qualified 
candidate credentials-wise (Nelson). In this line of professionalism 
                                                          
11 Racism and xenophobia are obvious core components of Trump‘s appeal (Taibbi xx). 
Hochschild has called Trump ―the identity politics candidate for white men‖ (229-230). 
Although Hell or High Water is primarily focused—and so has been my analysis—on 
narrating the economic distress behind potential Trump supporters, the film hints at 
race issues. One elderly man witness to one of the robberies is surprised to learn the 
Howards are not Mexicans. (min.6) 
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and technocracy, current politics may be tweaked or fine-tuned, but 
not structurally reformed. 
In conclusion, the political and cultural background 
portrayed in Hell High or Water is one where, according to Fraser, 
options had been narrowed down to either multicultural—
Democrats—or ethno-nationalist—Republicans—neoliberalism, both 
equally leading to ―financialization and deindustrialization […] 
[T]here was no force to oppose the decimation of working-class and 
middle-class standards of living […] That left,‖ continues Fraser, ―a 
sizeable segment of the U.S. electorate, victims of financialization 
and corporate globalization, without a natural political home. Given 
that neither of the two major blocs spoke for them, there was 
a gap in the American political universe: an empty, unoccupied zone, 
where anti-neoliberal, pro-working-family politics might have taken 
root.‖ Ultimately, the populist portrait in Hell or High Water 
dramatizes that gap Fraser refers to—the plot and the characters 
incarnating that unoccupied political terrain where no claims and 
demands can be brought to fruition, remaining unaddressed, 
untapped.     
 
4. IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSIONS: THE TEA PARTY AND THE 
POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF BERNIE SANDERS  
 
Hell or High Water shows populism to be the main explanatory force 
for the political context of 2016. However, the political and cultural 
world of the film is not exclusively circumscribed by populism, just 
as 2016 was a populist moment yet other types of discourses also 
played an important role in shaping the direction and outcomes of 
that moment. Thus, the film features other political realities built on 
logics not strictly attributable to the populist line heretofore 
described—which I have defined as the dichotomization of the 
political space prior to ideological mobilization, in compliance with 
Laclau.  
Figure 4  
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A major strand represented in the film is the political culture 
of the Tea Party, visible in, at least, three interlocked constituents: 
gun culture, the oil industry, and the unrepentantly individualistic 
nature of the leading characters—modern-day cowboys and outlaws. 
In fact, at one point we see an actual Tea Party image—the 
libertarian ―Don‘t Tread on Me‖ flag (Fig.4). 
The plot is rich in 2nd Amendment Rights tropes—an element 
elevated as the ultimate symbol of freedom by the Tea Party. In two 
sequences, Tanner and Toby storm out of the banks they have just 
robbed under a hail of bullets. In the latter sequence, Tanner kills 
two men who shoot him and Toby while ransacking the bank. Once 
Tanner and Toby leave the bank, the clients respond in a militia-like 
manner, car-chasing and shooting at the brothers (mins. 68-69). The 
images of the oil industry also loom large. The entire narration is 
dominated by oil. The ultimate goal of Toby‘s scheme is to retain the 
oil-drenched land where the family ranch is on. The mise-en-scène 
and visual grammar of the film repeatedly underscore the 
prominence of oil in the story (Fig.5). Even in the tense final dialogue 
between Toby and Marcus, a carefully framed shot shows oil pumps 
physically separating both characters (Fig.6). Tanner and Toby, 
deprived of any means to secure a decent livelihood, resort to 
breaking the law in order to safeguard the family ranch—the only 








 Figure 6  
Figure 5 
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All these elements can be related to one basic political 
byproduct of the Great Recession: estrangement from politics and 
polity-building. ―During the depression of the 1930s, Americans 
turned to the federal government for aid in their economic recovery. 
But in response to the Great Recession of 2008, a majority of 
Americans turned away from it‖ (Hochschild 8). It is within that 
political logic, fruitfully hegemonized by conservatism, where freedom 
is tantamount to absence of the federal government, that the right to 
bear guns becomes the means for people‘s own security, oil a window 
into a sound economy, and, overall, individual initiative the only 
province of personal agency. As Hochschild claims in her account of 
Tea Party culture ―I heard a great deal about freedom in the sense of 
freedom to—to talk on your cellphone as you drove a car, to pick up 
a drive-in daiquiri with a straw on the side, to walk about with a 
loaded gun. But there was almost no talk about freedom from such 
things as gun violence, car accidents, or toxic pollution‖ (71-72). In 
this mindset ―[t]he more oil, the more jobs. The more jobs, the more 
prosperity, and the less need for government aid‖ (73). We can see 
here how the demand for protection and stability can be ideologically 
colored by radicalizing classical forms of American individualism. 
Thus, ―[a]ll state intervention, except in connection with matters that 
cannot be regulated through the market, is considered as an attack 
on individual liberty‖ (Laclau and Mouffe 173). It is fair to say that 
measures such as gun control or environmental protection would not 
sit well with many of the gun-toting, job-seeking characters in Hell or 
High Water, for whom bearing arms and the oil industry are 
synonym for individual liberty and economic safety.  
Less noticeably, the film also represents discontent factoring 
in progressivism and class consciousness. The anti-establishment 
vein of the film, largely articulated via the anti-banks discourse, is 
occasionally expressed with different inflections. This is Alberto 
speaking, the half-Native American half-Mexican partner of Marcus:  
  
A long time ago, your ancestors [talking to Marcus] was the Indians 
till someone came along and killed them, broke ‗em down, made you 
into one of them. 150 years ago, all this was my ancestors‘ land 
[Mexicans]. Everything you can see. Everything you saw yesterday. 
Till the grandparents of these folks [current Caucasian West Texans] 
took it. And now, it‘s been taken from them. Except it ain‘t no army 
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doing it. It‘s those sons of bitches right there [pointing at the Texas 
Midlands Bank]. (mins. 57-58) 
 
Here, the narration conveys political critique on the grounds of race 
and class, the American experience being the succession of land 
expropriations and racial cleansings—a message akin to post-
consensus social histories. There is a comment at the end worth 
delving into, when Alberto says that the historical privilege of white 
Americans—meaning the land—has been ―taken from them‖ by an 
elite class that has economically emancipated from the majority of 
Americans. In Alberto‘s narrative, class status has equalized almost 
all social bodies. Acknowledging the historical phenomenon of racial 
violence and land dispossession, Alberto, nonetheless, sees the post-
Great Recession context as one where most citizens have been 
equally subject to exploitation and economic inequality—whites 
included. In addition, in one of the last sequences of the film, Toby 
voices his status as a long-time member of the white poor: ―I‘ve been 
poor my whole life. So were my parents, their parents before them. 
It‘s like a disease passing from generation to generation, becomes a 
sickness. That‘s what it is. Infects every person you know‖ (mins. 93-
94). In this new light, Toby‘s plan is meant to break free from the so-
called ―white trash‖ status—a reminder of white downward mobility 
as an integral constituent of American history (Isenberg 320). 
Alberto‘s and Toby‘s words highlight similar concerns by 
foregrounding, just as the Bernie Sanders‘ campaign did, the 
parameters of class and economic injustice as the crucial vectors to 
actually understand the nation‘s real state of affairs. ―The Sanders 
movement […],‖ writes Mike Davis, ―has shown that heartland 
discontent can be brought under the canopy of a ‗democratic 
socialism‘ that reignites New Deal hopes for fundamental economic 
rights and the Civil Rights Movement‘s goals of equality and social 
justice.‖ The Sanders campaign—retrieving a political discourse the 
Democratic Party had long dropped12—has placed the fight against 
income inequality and economic plutocracy as the main organizing 
principle for a transformative politics. Albeit secondarily, the film 
likewise addresses class factors as shaping the political discourse of 
the 2016 moment by having characters like Toby and Alberto 
                                                          
12 See the realignments in the Democratic Party since the 1970s in Berman 164-187; 
Frank, Listen 62-105; Waddan 1-43; and Wilentz 323-381. 
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articulate some of their discontents on the basis of class-warfare 




Hell or High Water is likely to be featured as a prescient film in the 
upcoming scholarly literature on American film and the Trump 
administration.13 In addition, this is a film that lends itself to be 
examined from manifold theoretical standpoints. The reading I have 
performed is but one possible approach. This film certainly warrants 
a gender perspective—the sense of masculinity-in-crisis as caused by 
deindustrialization (Kimmel 216) is pervasive throughout the 
narration. It would also merit a deeper analysis genre-wise—not only 
does the film tap into certain motifs connected to the subgenre of 
elegiac westerns14; it also heavily draws on the ethos, as noted 
before, of the so-called post-western as authored by Campbell (2013) 
given the film‘s multiple images related to the ―death of the west.‖  
As for the film‘s strictly political subtexts, I would favor 
analyses focused less on pigeonholing ideologically the film—e.g. pro-
Trump, pro-Sanders—than on identifying instances of economic 
angst and material wants that go unaddressed. Taylor Sheridan—the 
screenwriter of Hell or High Water—commented that the West Texas 
portrayed in the film is a 
 
community where there are no social services […] Planned 
Parenthood is three states away, so they don‘t understand why 
funding is going there. And money meant for highways doesn‘t make 
sense because their highways never get fixed. All these things, when 
you study them, start to explain the political leanings that have 
nothing to do with ideology. It has to do with [the question:] ‗how 
can I control this bubble right around me that‘s imploding?‘ 
 
Building on Sheridan‘s insights, the film shows, precisely, characters 
populating a socio-economic and political context that severely 
hollows out their living standards and the promises of prosperity and 
reward for hard work codified in the American dream—hence, an 
                                                          
13 A few film critics have seen Hell or High Water as being linked to the Trump 
demographic—see Ayuso, D‘Alessandro, and Doherty.    
14 The elegiac western zeroes in on the myth of the west as being either long-gone or 
dismantled–with the resulting sense of despair, disorientation, and crisis. See Lusted 
205-230.  
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array of political and economic discontents and resentments, which 
are ultimately attributed to malfunctioning institutions and actors. 
My emphasis on the dichotomizations that run though the film—
change vs. continuity; people vs. elites—has been meant to explain 
how the seismic shifts of 2016 can be fundamentally explained less 
through ideological divides than through the distinctive logic of 
populism—not that the epochal shifts of 2016 occurred in an 
ideology-free vacuum, as I have indicated in section four. The logic of 
populism is facilitated and exacerbated by the dynamics of 
neoliberalism. In Hell or High Water the landscapes and the leading 
characters become avatars for the consequences of financialization, 
offshoring, and deindustrialization. In the light of the film, Donald 
Trump and Bernie Sanders can be viewed as different channelings of 
similar urges and malaises, evincing how populism ―is not a fixed 
constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to 
very different uses‖ (Laclau 176).   
Hell or High Water narrativizes and aestheticizes the erosion 
of neoliberalism and the existence of potential populist lines dividing 
the social body, ready to be tapped into, ripe for ideological contents 
to shape them. Antonio Gramsci said that political decay tends to 
produce an impasse he termed interregnum—‖[w]here the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great 
variety of morbid symptoms appear‖ (556). What Hell or High Water 
delves into is, plain and simple, just that: the underpinnings of an 
economic and political hegemony crumbling and the raw materials 
for the next one emerging.       
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